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Abstract: We analyze a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate
policy in a two-country framework. First, the principals of both countries decide whether
to link their domestic emission permit markets to an international market. Second, the
principals select agents who then non-cooperatively determine the levels of emission permits.
Finally, these permits are traded on domestic or international permit markets. We find
that the principals in both countries have an incentive to select agents that care (weakly)
less for environmental damages than the principals do themselves. This incentive is more
pronounced under international permit markets, particularly for permit sellers, rendering an
international market less beneficial to at least one country. Our results may explain why we
do not observe international permit markets despite their seemingly favorable characteristics
and, more generally, suggest that treating countries as atomistic players may be an over-
simplifying assumption when analyzing strategic behavior in international policy making.
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1 Introduction
When analyzing international (environmental) policy, individual countries are usually rep-
resented by single benevolent decision makers, for example governments, that act in the best
interest of the country as a whole. In this paper, we depart from this idealized abstraction
by acknowledging that policies in modern democracies are typically shaped by hierarchical
processes. All these decision-making procedures have in common that a principal first de-
cides upon the rough orientation of the policy and then appoints an agent who elaborates
on the details of this policy (and possibly implements it).
The particular environmental policy we investigate is the formation of an international
emission permit market – which we will refer to as a “non-cooperative” international permit
market – in which countries non-cooperatively choose emission permit levels (Helm 2003).
Such a market may be preferable to purely domestic environmental policies (for example,
domestic emission taxes) because it equalizes – by design – the marginal benefits of emissions
across countries. This condition, while necessary for globally efficient emission reduction, is
only accidentally satisfied in case of purely domestic policies. The reason that we focus on
non-cooperative (in the game-theoretic sense) climate policies is twofold. On the one hand,
the recent UNFCCC negotiations for a successor to the Kyoto Protocol have proven the
difficulties of achieving international cooperation. As a consequence, the linking of existing
national or regional permit markets has been discussed as a complementary building block
for international climate policy (Flachsland et al. 2009; Jaffe et al. 2009; Green et al. 2014).
On the other hand, Carbone et al. (2009) demonstrate that even non-cooperative permit
markets exhibit substantial potential for greenhouse gas reductions. Despite their favorable
characteristics, however, we have yet to observe the formation of many such markets. Only
Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway joined the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU-ETS), and California and Québec linked their cap-and-trade systems in 2014.1
We shed light on this puzzle by analyzing the typical principal-agent relationship outlined
above in the context of international climate policy in a two-country framework. In a first
step, the principals of both countries determine whether to link their domestic emission per-
mit markets to an international market that is formed if and only if both principals agree
to do so. Second, each principal selects one agent who is responsible for issuing emission
permits. Then, the selected agents in both countries non-cooperatively determine the num-
ber of emission permits issued to domestic firms. Trading of permits – within or between
countries – takes place in the final stage.
1 While the EU-ETS is clearly an international permit market, we do not consider it “non-cooperative”
because of the supranational authority that the European Union exerts on the national governments with
respect to domestic emission permit levels.
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We find that the hierarchical structure of the political process gives rise to strategic del-
egation. The principals of both countries appoint agents that care (weakly) less for envi-
ronmental damages than do the principals. The reason is that emission permit levels are
strategic substitutes: By delegating the emission permit choice to a less green agent who –
ceteris paribus – issues more permits than the principal would do himself, the principal can
– again, ceteris paribus – induce the other country’s agent to reduce her emission permit
issuance. However, as the principals in both countries face similar incentives, they end arrive
at a prisoners’ dilemma: Both would be better off if they selected agents who share their
own preferences; yet, such self-representation is not an equilibrium of the game.
Moreover, the strategic delegation incentives are – for relevant parameter constellations –
stronger under an international permit market than under domestic permit markets. The
reason is that on an international market, there is an additional incentive to issue permits
that is driven by the permit market’s terms of trade. The principals of both the permit-
buying and the permit-selling country may gain from the issuance of more permits, which can
be achieved by delegating to a less green agent: Although total emissions and thus damages
in both countries will rise, the permit-selling country may be able to sell more permits
and realize the resulting revenues, whereas the permit-buying country benefits from a lower
permit price. However, the resulting increase in total emissions and associated damages from
delegating to less green agents renders linking less beneficial in many cases. Overall, we find
that the conditions for the formation of an international non-cooperative permit market are
less favorable than suggested by the standard permit market literature, which neglects the
hierarchical structure of international environmental policy.
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. It builds on the literature on non-
cooperative international permit markets, developed by Helm (2003), Carbone et al. (2009)
and Helm and Pichler (2015). While these papers assume that countries are represented by
one welfare-maximizing decision maker, we explicitly account for the principal-agent rela-
tionship between different bodies involved in international policy making within a single
country, for example, an incumbent government or president and a selected executive or
authority such as a ministry. In this regard, we draw on the strategic delegation literature
(Jones 1989; Burtraw 1992; Segendorff 1998) and the strategic voting literature (Persson and
Tabellini 1992), the two of which exhibit strong similarities when we interpret the electorate
or, to be more precise, the median voter as the principal and the elected government as the
agent. In this context “strategic” means that a principal is able to raise her payoff by mis-
representing her own preferences, i.e., delegating to an agent who does not share the same
preferences. This result may occur either if the selected agents cooperatively (or via a bar-
gaining procedure) determine the division or provision of a good or if they non-cooperatively
decide on an issue with inter-agent spillovers such as environmental externalities.
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In the context of environmental policy, Siqueira (2003), Buchholz et al. (2005), Roelfsema
(2007) and Hattori (2010) analyze strategic voting. While the first three contributions focus
on environmental taxation only, Hattori (2010) also examines the outcome of strategic vot-
ing under emissions caps. Siqueira (2003) and Buchholz et al. (2005) both find that voters’
decisions are biased toward politicians who are less green than the median voter. By electing
a more conservative politician, the home country commits itself to a lower tax on pollution,
shifting the burden of a cleaner environment to the foreign country. By contrast, Roelfsema
(2007) accounts for emissions leakage through shifts in production and finds that median
voters may delegate to politicians who place greater weight on environmental damage than
they do themselves, whenever their preferences for the environment relative to their valua-
tion of firms’ profits are sufficiently strong. This result, however, breaks down in the case of
perfect pollution spillovers, such as the emission and diffusion of greenhouse gases. Hattori
(2010) allows for different degrees of product differentiation and alternative modes of com-
petition, i.e., competition on quantities but also on prices. His general finding is that when
the policy choices are strategic substitutes (complements), a less (more) green policy maker
is elected in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Using a very general principal-agent frame-
work, Helm and Wirl (2014) find that an industrial country, as the principal, can ensure
the participation of a developing country (the agent) in an international climate agreement
by implementing a competitive permit market. As in Siqueira (2003) and Roelfsema (2007),
the agents selected by the principals in our model do not engage in bargaining but rather set
environmental policies according to their own preferences. In contrast to the aforementioned
papers, however, we examine delegation not only under caps but also under international
permit markets.2
The literature on linking offers several explanations for why “bottom-up” (or non-cooperative
in our terminology) approaches to permit trading have not been successful. Among the
obstacles identified by Green et al. (2014), for example, are different levels of ambition,
competing domestic policy objectives, objections to financial transfers and the difficulty of
regulatory coordination. We contribute to this literature by suggesting that the hierarchical
structures underlying environmental policy may be a reason for the rejection of otherwise
beneficial policies.
2 Strategic delegation in the provision of public goods is examined by Harstad (2010), Christiansen (2013)
and Kempf and Rossignol (2013). Harstad (2010) analyzes the incentives to delegate to more conservative
or more progressive politicians. While delegation to the former increases their bargaining position, the
latter are more likely to be included in majority coalitions and hence increase the political power of their
jurisdiction. The direction of delegation in this model is found to depend on the design of the political
system. Using a model of legislative bargaining, Christiansen (2013) shows that voters strategically delegate
to public good lovers. In Kempf and Rossignol (2013), the electorates of two countries each delegate to an
agent who then bargains with the delegate of the other country over the provision of a public good with
cross-country spillovers. The choice of delegates is highly dependent on the distributive characteristics of
the proposed agreement.
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Finally, our paper is strongly related to a companion paper (Habla and Winkler 2013), in
which we analyze the political economy of non-cooperative international emission permit
markets under legislative lobbying in each country. We regard the common agency and
strategic delegation models as complementary perspectives on the political process of mod-
ern democracies: Whereas the common agency framework assumes an incumbent decision
maker who is swayed by interest groups to implement policies in their favor, the strategic
delegation literature models the process of bringing a decision maker into power, in which
the principal recognizes that she might be better off by empowering a decision maker who
does not represent her own preferences because of strategic interactions between countries
through the selected agents.3
2 The model
We consider two countries, indexed by i = 1, 2 and −i = {1, 2} \ i.4 In each country i,
emissions ei imply country-specific benefits from the productive activities of a representative
firm. In addition, global emissions E = e1+e2 cause strictly increasing and convex country-
specific damages.
2.1 Non-cooperative international climate policy
Both countries establish perfectly competitive domestic emission permit markets and deter-
mine, non-cooperatively, the number of permits ωi issued to their representative domestic
firm. As firms in all countries i require emission permits for an amount equal to the emis-
sions they produce ei, global emissions are given by the sum of emission permits issued
E = ω1 + ω2. Countries may agree to link their domestic markets to an international mar-
ket. Then permits issued by both countries are non-discriminatorily traded on a perfectly
competitive international market.
Restricting emissions imposes a compliance cost on the representative firms and thus reduces
profits. If permits are traded internationally, firms have an opportunity to either generate
additional profits by selling permits or reduce the compliance cost by buying permits from
abroad. Thus, the profits of the representative firm read:
πi(ei) = Bi(ei) + p(ωi − ei) , i = 1, 2 , (1)
3 In addition, although both approaches analyze principal-agent relationships, the common agency approach
differs from strategic delegation to the extent that it includes competition among principals for political
influence. A single principal, by contrast, never faces any competition.
4 All our results can be generalized to n countries in a straightforward manner.
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where Bi(ei) denotes country-specific benefits from productive activities with Bi(0) = 0,
B′i > 0, B
′′
i < 0 and p is the price of permits on an international market. If countries decide
against linking, ωi = ei holds in equilibrium and the second term vanishes.
2.2 Political actors
In each country i there is a principal whose utility is given by:
Vi = πi(ei)− θ
M
i Di(E) , (2)
where Di(E) denote convex country-specific damages Di(E) with Di(0) = 0 and D
′
i > 0,
D′′i ≥ 0 for all E > 0 and i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, we normalize θ
M
i to unity.
In addition, there is a continuum of agents j of mass one in each country i, whose utility is
given by:
W ji = πi(ei)− θ
j
iDi(E) , (3)
where θji is a preference parameter that is continuously distributed on the bounded interval
[0, θmaxi ]. To ensure that, in both countries, the principal’s preferences are represented in
the continuum of agents, we impose θmaxi > 1.
In each country, all agents and the principal thus have equal stakes in the profits of the
domestic firm but differ with respect to environmental damage. This may be either because
damages are heterogeneously distributed or because the monetary valuation of homogenous
physical environmental damage differs. We assume that all political actors (principals and
agents) are selfish in the sense that they make their decisions to maximize their respective
utility, i.e., the principal in country i chooses her actions to maximize Vi, while agent j in
country i makes decisions to maximize his utility W ji .
2.3 Structure and timing of the game
We model the hierarchical structure of environmental policy as a non-cooperative sequential
game. In the first stage, the choice of regime, the principals in both countries simultaneously
determine whether an international permit market is formed. As countries are sovereign, an
international permit market only forms if the principals in both countries consent to doing
so. In the second stage, the principals simultaneously select an agent from the continuum of
available agents. In stage three, these selected agents simultaneously decide on the number
of emission allowances that are distributed to the representative domestic firms. In the
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final stage, emission permits are traded. The complete structure and timing of the game is
summarized as follows:
1. Choice of Regime:
Principals in both countries simultaneously decide whether the domestic permit mar-
kets are linked to an international market.
2. Strategic Delegation:
Principals in both countries simultaneously select an agent.
3. Emission Allowance Choices:
Selected agents in both countries simultaneously choose the number of emission per-
mits issued to the domestic firms.
4. Permit Trade:
Depending on the regime established in the first stage, emission permits are traded
on perfectly competitive domestic or international permit markets.
In essence, we analyze a standard non-cooperative international permit market as in Helm
(2003), which we amend by a strategic delegation stage. We argue that this model, despite
being highly stylized, captures essential characteristics of the hierarchical structure of do-
mestic and international environmental policy. As we discuss in greater detail in Section
6, the structure of the model is compatible with various delegation mechanisms present
in modern democratic societies. For example, the principal may be the median voter of
the electorate while the agent represents the elected government. Alternatively, the princi-
pal could be the parliament of a representative democracy that delegates a decision to an
agent, for example, to the minister of environment.
We solve the game by backward induction. Therefore, we first determine the equilibrium
numbers of emission permits for the two different regimes, which depend on the preferences
of the selected agents in both countries. Second, we determine the preferences of the agents
whom the principals select. Finally, we analyze whether the principals in both countries
consent to the formation of an international permit market.
3 Permit market equilibrium and delegated emissions permit choice
In the last stage and in the case of domestic emission permit markets, the market clearing
condition implies that ωi = ei for both countries i = 1, 2. Profit maximization of the
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representative firm leads to an equalization of marginal benefits with the equilibrium permit
price:
pi(ωi) = B
′
i(ei) , i = 1, 2 . (4)
In the case of an international permit market, there is only one permit market price, which
implies that in equilibrium, the marginal benefits of all participating countries are equalized:
p(E) = B′1
(
e1(E)
)
= B′2
(
e2(E)
)
. (5)
In addition, the market clearing condition:
ω1 + ω2 = B
′−1
1
(
p(E)
)
+B′−12
(
p(E)
)
= e1(E) + e2(E) = E , (6)
implicitly determines the permit price p(E) in the market equilibrium as a function of the
total number of issued emission allowances E. Existence and uniqueness follow directly from
the assumed properties of the benefit functions Bi. Equation (5) and ei(E) = B
′−1
i
(
p(E)
)
imply:
p′(E) =
B′′i
(
ei(E)
)
B′′−i
(
e−i(E)
)
B′′i
(
ei(E)
)
+B′′−i
(
e−i(E)
) < 0 , e′i(E) = B′′−i
(
e−i(E)
)
B′′i
(
ei(E)
)
+B′′−i
(
e−i(E)
) ∈ (0, 1) . (7)
For the remainder of the paper, we impose the following on the benefit functions Bi:
Assumption 1 (Sufficient conditions for SOCs to hold: part I)
The benefit functions of both countries are almost quadratic: B′′′i (ei) ≈ 0, i = 1, 2.
By almost quadratic, we mean that B′′′i (ei) is so small that it is irrelevant for determining
the sign of all expressions in which it appears. Note that B′′′i (ei) ≈ 0 for i = 1, 2 also implies
that p′′(E) ≈ 0. These assumptions are sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for the
second-order conditions in stage three of the game to hold.
3.1 Delegated permit choice under a domestic permit market
We first assume that no international permit market has been formed in the first stage of
the game. Then, the selected agent from country i sets the level of emission permits ωi to
maximize:
WDi = Bi(ωi)− θiDi(E) , (8)
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subject to equation (4) and given the permit choice ω−i of the other country. Then, the
reaction function of the selected agent i is implicitly given by:
B′i(ωi)− θiD
′
i(E) = 0 , (9)
implying that the selected agent in country i trades off the marginal benefits of issuing more
permits against the corresponding environmental damage costs. The following proposition
holds:
Proposition 1 (Unique Nash equilibrium on domestic permit markets)
For any given vector Θ = (θ1, θ2) of preferences of the selected agents under domestic permit
markets, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame beginning
in stage three in which all countries i = 1, 2 simultaneously set emission permit levels ωi to
maximize (8) subject to (4) and for a given permit level ω−i of the other country.
The proofs of all propositions and corollaries are relegated to the Appendix.
We denote the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame beginning in stage three
by ΩD(Θ) =
(
ωD1 (Θ), ω
D
2 (Θ)
)
and the total emission level of this equilibrium by ED(Θ). For
later use, we analyze how the equilibrium emission levels change with a marginal change in
the preferences of the selected agent in country i.
Corollary 1 (Comparative statics on domestic permit markets)
The following conditions hold for the levels of national emissions ωDi , ω
D
−i and total emis-
sions ED in the Nash equilibrium ΩD(Θ):
dωDi (Θ)
dθi
< 0 ,
dωD−i(Θ)
dθi
≥ 0 ,
dED(Θ)
dθi
< 0 . (10)
Corollary 1 states that domestic emission levels ωDi of country i and global emissions E
D
are lower in equilibrium the higher is the preference parameter θi, i.e., the more country i’s
selected agent cares for the environment. Moreover, emission levels are strategic substitutes.
If country i decreases emission levels in response to a change in the preference parameter
θi, then country −i increases its emissions and vice versa. This does not hold for linear
damages, in which case emission choices are dominant strategies and thus dωD−i(Θ)/dθi = 0.
In any case, the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect, and total emissions ED follow
the domestic emission level ωDi in equilibrium.
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3.2 Delegated permit choice under an international permit market
If an international permit market is formed in the first stage, country i’s selected agent
chooses ωi to maximize:
W Ii = Bi
(
ei(E)
)
+ p(E) [ωi − ei(E)]− θiDi(E) , (11)
subject to equations (5), (6) and given ω−i. Taking into account that p(E) = B
′
i
(
ei(E)
)
, the
reaction function of the agent in country i is given by:
p(E) + p′(E) [ωi − ei(E)]− θiD
′
i(E) = 0 . (12)
By summing the reaction functions for both countries, the equilibrium permit price is equal
to the average marginal environmental damage costs of the selected agents:
p(E) =
1
2
[
θiD
′
i(E) + θ−iD
′
−i(E)
]
. (13)
Inserting equation (13) back into the reaction function (12) reveals that, in equilibrium, the
country whose agent exhibits above-average marginal damages is the permit buyer, whereas
the country whose agent’s marginal damages are below average is the permit seller. Again,
there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame beginning at stage
three:
Proposition 2 (Unique Nash equilibrium on international permit markets)
For any given vector Θ = (θ1, θ2) of preferences of the selected agents under an interna-
tional permit market, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame
beginning at stage three in which both countries simultaneously set the levels of emission
permits ωi to maximize (11) subject to equations (5), (6) and taking the permit level ω−i of
the other country as given.
Denoting the Nash equilibrium by ΩI(Θ) =
(
ωI1(Θ), ω
I
2(Θ)
)
and the total equilibrium emis-
sions by EI(Θ), we analyze the influence of the selected agents’ preferences on the equilib-
rium permit choices:
Corollary 2 (Comparative statics on international permit markets)
The following conditions hold for the levels of emission allowances ωIi , ω
I
−i and total emis-
sions EI in the Nash equilibrium ΩI(Θ):
dωIi (Θ)
dθi
< 0 ,
dωI−i(Θ)
dθi
> 0 ,
dEI(Θ)
dθi
< 0 . (14)
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As before, an increase in θi decreases the equilibrium permit level ω
I
i and overall emissions
but increases the equilibrium allowance choice ωI−i of the other country. In the case of an
international permit market, domestic emissions are not equal to the domestic allowance
choices. In fact, equilibrium emissions decrease in both countries if θi increases in one of the
countries, as a reduction in total emission permits increases the equilibrium permit price.
4 Strategic delegation
We now turn to the selection of agents by the principals in the second stage of the game. As
all agents living in country i are potential candidates to be selected, and the principals can
always find a delegate for preference parameters in the interval θi ∈
[
0, θmaxi
]
. We shall see
that principals will select agents who have (weakly) less concern for the environment than
they have themselves, i.e., they wish to select agents with θi ≤ 1. Thus, the assumption
θmaxi > 1 ensures that principals can always appoint their preferred agent. In addition, we
impose:
Assumption 2 (Sufficient conditions for SOCs to hold: part II)
The damage functions of both countries are almost quadratic: D′′′i (ei) ≈ 0, i = 1, 2.
Together with Assumption 1, this assumption ensures that the utility Vi of the principals
in both countries is strictly concave under both permit market regimes R ∈ {D, I}, as we
show in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4.
4.1 Strategic delegation under domestic permit markets
First, assume a domestic permit markets regime. Then, the principal in country i selects an
agent with preferences θi such that:
V Di = Bi
(
ωDi (Θ)
)
−Di
(
ED(Θ)
)
(15)
is maximized given the Nash equilibrium ΩD(Θ) of the subgame beginning in the third stage
and the preferences θ−i of the selected agent in the other country. We derive the following
first-order condition:
B′i
(
ωDi (Θ)
)dωDi (Θ)
dθi
−D′i
(
ED(Θ)
)dED(Θ)
dθi
= 0 , (16)
which implicitly determines the best-response function θDi (θ−i). Taking into account the
equilibrium outcome of the third stage, in particular equation (9), we can re-write the
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first-order condition to yield:
(1− θi)D
′
i
(
ED(Θ)
)dED(Θ)
dθi
= −B′i
(
ωDi (Θ)
)dωD−i(Θ)
dθi
. (17)
It states that in equilibrium, the marginal costs of strategic delegation have to equal its
marginal benefits. The costs of choosing an agent with lower environmental preferences
(left-hand side) are given by the additional (compared to θi = 1) marginal damage caused
by the increase in total emissions. The benefits from strategic delegation (right-hand side)
depend on how much of the abatement effort can be passed on to the other country due to
the strategic substitutability of emission permit choices. This passed-on abatement effort is
given by the marginal production benefits (of having to abate less) times the decrease in
the number of permits that the other country issues. In particular, there is no incentive for
strategic delegation if emission permit choices are dominant strategies, i.e., dωD−i(Θ)/dθi = 0.
The subgame beginning in stage two exhibits a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 3 (Unique Nash equilibrium under domestic permit markets)
Given a domestic permit markets regime, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium of the subgame beginning at stage two in which the principals of both countries i = 1, 2
simultaneously select agents with preferences θi to maximize (15) subject to Ω
D(Θ) and given
the choice θ−i of the principal in country −i.
The following corollary characterizes this equilibrium, the outcome of which we denote by
ΘD = (θD1 , θ
D
2 ):
Corollary 3 (Properties of the NE under domestic permit markets)
For the equilibrium ΘD, the following conditions hold:
1. For both countries, 0 < θDi ≤ 1 holds.
2. Self-representation (θDi = 1) is an equilibrium strategy if and only if the permit choice
at stage three is a dominant strategy (dω−i(Θ)/dθi = 0).
Corollary 3 states that the principals in both countries solve the trade-off mentioned above
by delegating the choice of emission permits to agents who are (weakly) less green (θDi ≤ 1)
than they are themselves.5 The intuition for this result is that emission permit choices
in stage three of the game are – for strictly convex damages – strategic substitutes. By
increasing the level of domestic emission permits, the other country can be induced to
reduce its issuance of permits. Thus, abatement costs can be partly shifted to the other
country. For linear damages, this shifting of the burden of abatement to the other country
5 This result is in line with the findings of Segendorff (1998), Siqueira (2003) and Buchholz et al. (2005).
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is not possible because the permit choices in the third stage are dominant strategies. As a
consequence, self-representation will prevail in equilibrium.
More generally, delegating the emission allowance choice to an agent with less green prefer-
ences is a commitment device for principals to signal a high issuance of emission allowances
(thereby, ceteris paribus, inducing a smaller issuance of emission allowances by the other
country). The signal is credible, as agents choose an emission permit level that is in their
own best interest but is inefficiently low from the principals’ point of view.6
4.2 Strategic delegation under an international permit market
Now assume an international permit market regime. Then, the principal in country i selects
an agent with preferences θi to maximize:
V Ii = Bi
(
ei
(
EI(Θ)
))
+ p
(
EI(Θ)
) [
ωIi (Θ)− ei
(
EI(Θ)
)]
−Di
(
EI(Θ)
)
, (18)
given the Nash equilibrium ΩI(Θ) of the subgame beginning in the third stage and the
preferences θ−i of the selected agent in the other country. Now, the first-order condition
reads:
p
(
EI(Θ)
)dωIi (Θ)
dθi
+
{
p′
(
EI(Θ)
) [
ωIi (Θ)− ei
(
EI(Θ)
)]
−D′i
(
EI(Θ)
)} dEI(Θ)
dθi
= 0 , (19)
which implicitly defines the best-response function θIi (θ−i). Compared to the case of domes-
tic permit markets, an additional term enters the principals’ trade-off due to the terms of
trade on the international permit market. Again, we can re-write the first-order condition
by taking into account the equilibrium in the third stage, in particular equation (12):
(1− θi)D
′
i
(
EI(Θ)
)dEI(Θ)
dθi
= −p
(
EI(Θ)
)dωI−i(Θ)
dθi
. (20)
Similar to equation (17), this equation says that in equilibrium, the marginal costs of strate-
gic delegation have to equal its marginal benefits. The only difference is that the marginal
benefits of having to abate less due to the strategic substitutability of permit choices are
now equal across countries and given by the uniform permit price p.
There exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame beginning at stage two:
Proposition 4 (Nash equilibrium under international permit market)
Given an international permit market regime, there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
6 On delegation and commitment, see also Perino (2010).
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rium of the subgame beginning at stage two in which the principals of both countries i = 1, 2
simultaneously select agents with preferences θi to maximize (18) subject to Ω
I(Θ) and given
the choice θ−i of the principal in country −i.
A unique interior Nash equilibrium exists if and only if the following condition holds:
(
B′′i (.)
)2
B′′−i(.)
[
3B′′−i(.) + 2B
′′
i (.)
]
− 2D′′i (E)
[
B′′i (.) +B
′′
−i(.)
]3
B′′i (.)B
′′
−i(.)
[
3B′′−i(.) + 2B
′′
i (.)
]2 < D
′
−i(E
I(ΘI))
D′i(E
I(ΘI))
<
B′′i (.)B
′′
−i(.)
[
3B′′i (.) + 2B
′′
−i(.)
]2
B′′−i(.)
(
B′′−i(.)
)2 [
3B′′i (.) + 2B
′′
−i(.)
]
− 2D′′−i(E
I(ΘI))
[
B′′i (.) +B
′′
−i(.)
]3 .
(21)
In contrast to Propositions 1–3, even Assumptions 1 and 2 do not guarantee a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. However, as we shall see in the numerical exercise in
Section 5, the game has a unique (although not necessarily interior) Nash equilibrium for
empirically relevant parameter constellations.
Denoting the vector of Nash equilibria ~ΘI , where ΘI = (θI1, θ
I
2), the following corollary
characterizes the properties of each of its elements:
Corollary 4 (Properties of NE under an international permit market)
For any Nash equilibrium ΘI , the following conditions hold:
1. For both countries, θIi < 1 holds.
2. The Nash equilibrium ΘI may be a corner solution, i.e., θIi = 0, θ
I
−i = θ
I
−i(0).
3. The reaction function of the principal from the permit-selling country i lies strictly
below the reaction function of the principal from the permit-buying country −i if
|B′′i (·)| < |B
′′
−i(·)|.
Corollary 4 implies that in the case of an international permit market, self-representation
(θIi = 1) can never be an equilibrium strategy, even for constant marginal damages, as the
interaction through the permit market ensures that permit choices in stage three of the game
are strategic substitutes. In other words, the principals in both countries attempt to shift
the burden of emissions abatement to the other country by delegating the choice of emission
permits to agents who value environmental damages strictly less than they do themselves
(θIi < 1). However, under an international permit market regime, the incentive for strategic
delegation may be so strong for one country that the principal would prefer to empower an
agent with a negative preference parameter θi, which would imply that the agent perceives
environmental damages as a benefit. As the distribution of preference parameters among the
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agents has a lower bound at zero, the best the principal can do under these circumstances
is to select an agent who does not care about environmental damages.
The last part of Corollary 4 states that the principal of the permit-selling country, i.e., the
one exhibiting the relatively lower θiD
′
i(E
I(ΘI)) compared with the other country, has a
higher incentive for strategic delegation than the principal in the permit-buying country if
the permit-selling country also has the lower carbon efficiency, respectively abatement costs,
measured by |B′′i (·)|. We will see in the numerical illustration in Section 5 that the latter
condition is not restrictive, as (at least under self-representation) the formation of an inter-
national permit market is most likely to be mutually beneficial if we match a country with
high environmental damages (and, therefore, the permit-buying country) and high carbon
efficiency with a country with low environmental damages (and, therefore, the permit-selling
country) and low carbon efficiency.
4.3 Comparison of delegation choices under the two regimes
Comparing the principals’ incentives to delegate to less green agents under the two regimes,
we can show that these are – under rather weak conditions – stronger in the international
permit market regime than in a regime with domestic permit markets:
Proposition 5 (Comparison of delegation incentives)
For the reaction function of the principal of country i, θIi (θ−i) < θ
D
i (θ−i) ≤ 1 holds for any
0 ≤ θ−i ≤ 1 if the following condition holds:
D′−i(E)
D′i(E)
> −
[
1 +
D′′−i(E)
[
(B′′i (.))
2 − (B′′−i(.))
2
]
B′′i (.)(B
′′
−i(.))
2
]
. (22)
Proposition 5 implies that whenever B′′i (.) and B
′′
−i(.) are sufficiently close, the principals
of both countries will – for any given choice of the other principal – select an agent under
the international permit market regime who is less green compared with their choice under
domestic permit markets. The intuition for this result is best understood by the following
thought experiment. Assume that both countries are perfectly symmetric with respect to
all exogenously given parameters and that damages are strictly convex. This implies that
without strategic delegation, i.e., θi = 1, the allowance choices would be the same under
both regimes. In particular, under an international permit market regime, both countries
would issue emission permits equal to the volume of domestic emissions and no permit
trading would occur.
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θ2
θ1
Figure 1: Reaction functions for the delegation stage for the principals in country 1 (light)
and country 2 (dark) under the regimes R = D (red) and R = I (blue).
Now consider the Nash equilibrium ΘD for this situation. Obviously it would also be sym-
metric, but as θDi < 1, the emission permit levels in both countries are higher than in the
case of self-representation. To see that ΘD cannot be an equilibrium under an international
permit market regime, recall that the country whose agent exhibits the smaller marginal
environmental damages θiD
′
i
(
EI(ΘI)
)
is the seller of permits. Beginning from the symmetric
equilibrium of the domestic permit market regime, the principals in both countries have an
incentive to drive down θi to become the seller of emission permits and realize the resulting
revenues. Ultimately, this race to the bottom leads again to a symmetric equilibrium, in
which both countries are neither buyers nor sellers but overall emissions are higher, i.e.,
EI > ED.
Yet, even if the reaction functions of both principals shift inward under R = I relative to R =
D for sufficiently similar curvatures of the benefit functions, i.e., θIi (θ−i) < θ
D
i (θ−i) for all i,
this does not imply that both countries will also delegate to a less green agent in equilibrium.
The point of intersection of the two reaction functions under R = I could still lie to the upper
left or lower right of the respective point under R = D (or be a corner solution). This is
illustrated in Figure 1.7 In this example, both countries exhibit identical damage functions,
but for any given level of domestic emissions e¯, the marginal benefits from emissions are
higher and decrease to a greater extent in country 2 (i.e., B′2(e¯) > B
′
1(e¯) and |B
′′
2 (e¯)| >
7 Details on all numerical illustrations are given in the Appendix.
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|B′′1 (e¯)|). Thus, country 2 has a higher carbon efficiency, respectively higher abatement costs
of emissions. Under self-representation, both countries would produce emissions exactly
equal to the number of permits they issue and, thus, no trade in permits would occur
between the countries under an international permit market regime. In the case of strategic
delegation, the country with higher abatement costs (here, country 2) has less incentive to
abate under a domestic permit market regime and, therefore, chooses an agent with a lower
preference parameter θ2. Under an international permit market regime, the country whose
marginal benefits decrease less strongly (here, country 1), profits more from an increase in
the total number of issued permits and, therefore, chooses an agent with a lower preference
parameter θ1. Thus, although both reaction functions under R = I lie strictly below those
under R = D, the principal of country 2 chooses in equilibrium an agent under R = I that
exhibits higher environmental awareness than her delegated agent under R = D, and vice
versa for country 1.
5 Formation of international emission permit markets
We now turn to the question of which permit market regime R ∈ {D, I} will be established
in the first stage of the game. To this end, we first examine the circumstances under which
the principals in both countries consent to the formation of an international permit mar-
ket. Then, we discuss how strategic delegation induces less favorable circumstances for an
international emission permit market to form.
5.1 The choice of regime
Recall that an international permit market only forms in the first stage if the principals
in both countries consent to doing so. Thus, an international permit market only forms if
this is in the best interest of the principals in both countries. In considering their preferred
regime choices, the principals in both countries anticipate the influence of the regime choice
on the outcomes of the following stages. Thus, principals are aware that the regime choice
R ∈ {D, I} in the first stage induces preference parameters for the selected agents given by
ΘR and emission allowance choices of ΩR(ΘR). As a consequence, the principal in country
i prefers an international emission permit market if:
∆Vi ≡ Bi
(
ei
(
EI(ΘI)
))
−Bi
(
ωDi (Θ
D)
)
+ p
(
EI(ΘI)
)[
ωIi (Θ
I)− ei
(
EI(ΘI)
)]
− θMi
[
Di
(
EI(ΘI)
)
−Di
(
ED(ΘD)
)]
> 0 ,
(23)
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which denotes the utility difference of the principal in country i between the international
and the domestic permit market regime given the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the
second and third stages of the game under the respective regime.
Then, an international permit market forms if and only if it is a Pareto improvement for
the principals over domestic permit markets:8
∆Vi > 0 ∧ ∆V−i > 0 . (24)
Helm (2003) shows that for the standard non-cooperative international permit market (in
our notation, this implies that ΘD = ΘI is exogenously given) global emissions may be
smaller or larger under an international permit market relative to a situation with domestic
permit markets. In addition, it is possible that global emissions are lower under an inter-
national emission permit market regime but at least one country does not consent to it.
Finally, global emissions may be higher under an international permit market regime, but
both countries may nevertheless consent to linking domestic permit markets to an interna-
tional market. These results also hold for our setting. Which of the different cases applies
depends on the set of exogenously given parameters, in particular on the distribution of
benefits from local and damages from global emissions.
5.2 Strategic delegation and the formation of international permit markets
In the following, we show that strategic delegation may hinder the formation of an interna-
tional permit market in the sense that under strategic delegation, an international permit
market may not be Pareto superior to domestic permit markets from the principals’ point
of view, while it would have been without strategic delegation, i.e., if the principals in both
countries had themselves decided on the issuance of emission permits.
Proposition 6 (International permit markets under strategic delegation)
Under strategic delegation, the formation of an international emission permits market may
not be in the best interest of both principals, i.e., ∆Vi ≤ 0 for at least one i = 1, 2, even if
it would have been in the case of self-representation.
8 We implicitly assume that country i’s principal only favors an international permit market over domestic
permit markets if ∆Vi is strictly positive. The intuition behind this tie-breaking rule is the assumption that
domestic permit markets represent the status quo. If linking domestic permit markets to an international
market induces some positive costs ǫ, then ∆Vi > ǫ > 0 has to hold for an international permit market
to be favorable. However, this tie-breaking rule does not qualitatively affect our results, and any other
tie-breaking rule is permissible.
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Without strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θ
R
2 ω
R
1 ω
R
2 e
R
1 e
R
2 E
R V R1 V
R
2
R = D 1 1 0.95 0.82 1.77 0.40 0.34
R = I 1 1 1.02 0.68 0.80 0.90 1.70 0.44 0.37
With strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θ
R
2 ω
R
1 ω
R
2 e
R
1 e
R
2 E
R V R1 V
R
2
R = D 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.83 1.78 0.40 0.34
R = I 0 0.86 1.08 0.70 0.85 0.93 1.78 0.43 0.33
Table 1: Overview of the outcomes in the subgame perfect Nash equilibria without and
with strategic delegation for the numerical example detailed in the Appendix.
We illustrate Proposition 6 with a numerical example (the details of which can be found in
the Appendix). To this end, we choose parameter constellations such that one country (or
country block) exhibits a low carbon efficiency (which is equivalent to low abatement costs)
and its principal a low willingness to pay (WTP) to prevent environmental damages, and
the second country has a high carbon efficiency and its principle a high WTP to prevent
environmental damages. One can think of country 1 as a country in transition, while country
2 represents a developed country. This constellation is known to render the most favorable
conditions for the formation of an international emission permits market (Carbone et al.
2009) and for reductions in aggregate emissions relative to domestic permit markets. The
example also demonstrates that we obtain unique (although not necessarily interior) Nash
equilibria for plausible and empirically relevant parameter constellations.
We calibrate the example to China (country 1) and the European Union (country 2), using
relative energy productivities taken from the OECD Green Growth Indicators database
as a proxy for carbon efficiencies and using relative WTPs based on the rough estimates
provided in Carbone et al. (2009). The results are illustrated in Table 1. In the case of
self-representation, an international permit market comes into existence as the principals of
both the EU and China have higher payoffs under international than under domestic permit
markets. Furthermore, China is the seller of emission permits, which is in line with findings
from Carbone et al. (2009). The EU, being the high-damage country block, benefits from
both an overall decrease in total emissions and a decrease in marginal abatement costs.
In the case of strategic delegation, the delegation incentives are rather mild under domestic
permit markets, as can be seen in Figure 2, which depicts the reaction functions from the
delegation stage for the principals in both countries. As a consequence, total emissions under
this regime rise only slightly compared with the case of self-representation due to a slightly
higher permit issuance by country 2, and the two principals’ payoffs are nearly the same
as without strategic delegation. In the case of an international permit market, however, the
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θ1
Figure 2: Reaction functions for the principals in country 1 (China, light) and country 2
(EU, dark) under the regimes R = D (red) and R = I (blue) at the delegation
stage.
delegation incentives for the permit-selling country are much stronger than those for the
permit-buying country, as stated in Corollary 4 and shown in Figure 2. The principal of
country 1, i.e., China, even chooses a corner solution in equilibrium and delegates to an agent
with environmental preferences at the lower bound of the distribution (zero). By doing so,
the number of emission permits issued in China rises by approximately 5% compared with
self-representation, whereas the EU increases the number of permits only slightly compared
with self-representation. Overall emissions rise in both regimes under strategic delegation
relative to self-representation and, unsurprisingly, by relatively more in the case of an in-
ternational permit market. While the principal of country 1 still prefers an international
permit market regime, the principal of the other country would incur excessive damages
under this regime and is, thus, better off under domestic permit markets. In contrast to the
case of self-representation, no international market will emerge.
Our sensitivity analyses, detailed in the Appendix, show that varying relative carbon efficien-
cies, holding relative WTPs fixed, yields qualitatively identical results. Increasing, ceteris
paribus, China’s WTP for environmental damages, however, makes an interior solution for
the delegation choices under an international permits market more likely, i.e., delegation in
this regime is less strong for China, and – for sufficiently close WTPs for the two countries
– a permit market will not be formed even without strategic delegation.
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This example highlights that while the formation of an international permit market may
be beneficial for all principals if they represent themselves, this is less likely to be the case
under strategic delegation. The reason is that the incentives to delegate to less green agents
are usually much stronger under an international permit market relative to domestic permit
markets. This commitment by the principals leads to higher aggregate emissions and makes
the principal of the high-damage country (the EU) less inclined to consent to the formation
of an international market.
6 Discussion
Our results rely on Assumptions 1 and 2 of almost quadratic benefit and environmental
cost functions. At least with respect to climate change, the empirical literature finds that
both abatement cost curves (which correspond to the benefits of not abating emissions) and
damage cost curves can be well approximated by quadratic functions (e.g., Tol 2002; Klepper
and Peterson 2006). In addition, Assumptions 1 and 2 are sufficient but not necessary
conditions for our results to hold.
We analyze a particular environmental policy in our model: emission permit markets. How-
ever, our results do not hinge on the domestic policy being an emissions permit scheme,
which we chose for analytical convenience. Our results would still hold if we considered
domestic emission tax schemes instead. In addition, whether permits are grandfathered or
auctioned is inconsequential in our model, as firm profits accrue to the individual agents
in the respective countries. In the case of grandfathering, endowing firms with permits for
free implies higher profits for the firms and, thus, higher income for the individual agents,
whereas in the case of auctioning, the revenues from the auction would directly accrue to
the individual agents, for example, in the form of a lump-sum transfer.
We model a highly stylized, four-stage principal-agent game. Nevertheless, we argue that
both the timing of the game and the delegation procedure is compatible with different
principal-agent relationships that arise in the hierarchical policy procedures of modern
democracies. We wish to illustrate this claim with two examples. First, assume that the
principal is the median voter and the agent is an elected government.9 Then, the four-stage
game translates into the following sequence of events. In stage one, the median voter decides
on the regime choice. While this may be unusual in representative democracies, this is rather
the rule in direct democracies such as Switzerland, where binary and one-shot decisions are
9 For this interpretation, we require that θMi = 1 is indeed the median in the preference distribution
with respect to environmental damages. This can always be achieved by an appropriate normalization. In
addition, it is straightforward to show that the voters can be ordered according to the preference parameter
θji , with ∂ωi/∂θ
j
i < 0. As a consequence, the median voter theorem applies.
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often made by the electorate via referendum. In the second stage, the median voter elects
a government that determines the number of allowances issued to the domestic firms in
the third stage. Following this interpretation, we have a strategic voting game between the
electorate and the elected government.
Second, assume that the principal is the parliament of a representative democracy and the
agent is, for example, the minister of environment. Now, the parliament determines the
regime choice in the first stage. In the second stage, the parliament elects the executive, in-
cluding the minister of environment, who then determines the number of emission allowances
in the third stage. While it is rather unusual that the parliament, i.e., the legislative, elects
the executive, this is, for example, the case in Germany.
The structure and timing of our principal-agent game is consistent with real-world hi-
erarchical decision-making procedures, but there is a more general interpretation of the
principal-agent relationship in our game setting. Because of the strategic interaction at the
international level, the principals in both countries have an incentive to signal to the other
principal that they will choose a less green policy to free-ride on the abatement efforts of the
other country. However, such a signal is only credible if the principals can somehow commit
to actually pursuing the signaled policy, as it is at odds with their own preferences. The
strategic delegation framework in our model provides such a commitment device for the prin-
cipal to signal a credible international policy to the principal of the other country. Yet, any
other credible commitment device, such as investments in adaptation to climate change or
in long-lived, emissions-intensive energy infrastructure would result in a similar race to the
bottom whereby principals in both countries would issue more emission allowances than if
they could not credibly commit to such a policy.10 Thus, our results are qualitatively robust
beyond the particular principal-agent relationship considered in our model framework.
Our explicit discussion of the hierarchical structure of international environmental poli-
cies may shed light on the puzzle of why we have yet to witness the formation of many
non-cooperative international permit markets. The advantage of an international permit
market, in which individual countries non-cooperatively determine permit issuance, over
non-cooperative domestic environmental policies is the equalization of marginal benefits
from emissions across all countries, which is a necessary condition for efficiency. However,
from the principals’ perspective, the efficiency gains from equalizing marginal benefits across
countries come at the cost of a higher degree of strategic delegation, i.e., the incentive to del-
egate the emission permit choice to agents who have a lower valuation for the environment
than they have themselves. As this incentive is likely to be stronger under an international
10 Copeland (1990), Buchholz and Konrad (1994), Buchholz and Haslbeck (1997) and Beccherle and Tirole
(2011) discuss technological choices and investments as commitment devices through which a country can
improve its position in negotiations concerning an environmental agreement.
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than under a domestic permit market regime, there is an additional trade-off favoring the
domestic permit market regime that has been overlooked in the standard non-cooperative
permit market setting.
Finally, we would like to discuss the relationship between this paper and Habla and Winkler
(2013), in which we analyze the influence of legislative lobbying on the formation of a non-
cooperative international permit market. In Habla andWinkler (2013), we find that lobbying
may backfire in the sense that if one lobby’s influence increases in one country, this may
lead to a policy shift in the direction that is less favored by the lobby. For example, if the
green lobby increases its influence in one country, this may result in higher total emissions
and, thus, higher environmental damages in both countries. The reason for this effect is
that, while an increase in the green lobby group’s influence in one country reduces the
equilibrium emissions in both the domestic and the international permit market regimes, it
may also induce a regime shift from the regime with lower toward the regime with higher
total emissions. As discussed in Habla and Winkler (2013), this result holds not only for
legislative lobbying but for any changes in the preferences of the decision maker. In fact, it
also applies to a change in the preference parameter θMi of the principal in country i in the
model framework of this paper, as we show in the Appendix.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the non-cooperative formation of an international permit market in a
hierarchical policy framework, in which a principal in each country chooses an agent who
is responsible for determining the domestic emissions allowance. We find that principals in
both countries choose agents who have less green preferences than they have themselves.
As emission allowance choices are strategic substitutes, delegation allows the principals
to credibly commit to a less green policy and, thus, shift – ceteris paribus – part of the
abatement burden to the other country. However, due to the additional terms of trade effect,
this incentive is (usually) stronger under an international permit market regime than under
domestic permit markets and is particularly strong for the permit seller. As a consequence,
under strategic delegation, the formation of an international permit market is less likely to
be a Pareto improvement for the principals than under conditions of self-representation.
While our results may explain the reluctance to establish non-cooperative international
permit markets, despite their seemingly favorable characteristics, they also constitute the
more general warning that treating countries as atomistic agents in the international policy
arena may be an oversimplification. As a consequence, the analysis of the nexus between
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domestic and international (environmental) policy seems to be a promising avenue for future
research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Existence: The maximization problem of country i’s selected agent is strictly concave:
SOCDi ≡ B
′′
i (ωi)− θiD
′′
i (E) < 0 . (A.1)
Thus, for each country i = 1, 2, the reaction function yields a unique best response for any
given choice ω−i of the other country. This guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Uniqueness: Solving the best response functions (9) for ei and summing up over both
countries yields the following equation for the aggregate emissions E:11
E = B′−1i
(
θiD
′
i(E)
)
+B′−1−i
(
θ−iD
′
−i(E)
)
. (A.2)
As the left-hand side is strictly increasing and the right-hand side is decreasing in E, there
exists a unique level of total emissions ED(Θ) in the Nash equilibrium. Substituting back
into the reaction functions yields the unique Nash equilibrium
(
ωD1 (Θ), ω
D
2 (Θ)
)
. 
Proof of Corollary 1
Introducing the abbreviation
ΓDi ≡ B
′′
i (ωi)SOC
D
−i − θiD
′′
i (E)B
′′
−i(ω−i) > 0 , (A.3)
and applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions (9) for both coun-
tries, we derive:
dωDi (Θ)
dθi
=
D′i(E)SOC
D
−i
ΓDi
< 0 , (A.4a)
dωD−i(Θ)
dθi
=
D′i(E)θ−iD
′′
−i(E)
ΓDi
≥ 0 , (A.4b)
dED(Θ)
dθi
=
D′i(E)B
′′
−i(ω−i)
ΓDi
< 0 . (A.4c)

Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Existence: By virtue of Assumption 1 and as e′i(E) ∈ (0, 1), the maximization problem
11 As all marginal benefit functions B′i are strictly and monotonically decreasing, the inverse functions B
′−1
i
exist and are also strictly and monotonically decreasing.
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of country i’s delegate is strictly concave:
SOCIi = p
′(E)[2− e′i(E)] + p
′′(E)[ωi − ei(E)]− θiD
′′
i (E) < 0 . (A.5)
Thus, for each country i = 1, 2, the reaction function yields a unique best response for any
given choice ω−i of the other country, which guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Uniqueness: Summing up the reaction function (12) over both countries yields the fol-
lowing condition, which holds in the Nash equilibrium:
2p(E) = θiD
′
i(E) + θ−iD
′
−i(E) . (A.6)
The left-hand side is strictly decreasing in E, while the right-hand side is increasing in E.
Thus, there exists a unique level of total emission allowances EI(Θ) in the Nash equilibrium.
Inserting EI(Θ) back into the reaction functions (12) yields the unique equilibrium allowance
choices
(
ωIi (Θ), ω
I
−i(Θ)
)
. 
Proof of Corollary 2
Introducing the abbreviation
ΓI = p′(E)[SOCIi + SOC
I
−i − p
′(E)] > 0 , (A.7)
and applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions (12) for both coun-
tries, we derive:
dωIi (Θ)
dθi
=
D′i(E)SOC
I
−i
ΓI
< 0 , (A.8a)
dωI−i(Θ)
dθi
= −
D′i(E)
[
SOCI−i − p
′(E)
]
ΓI
> 0 , (A.8b)
dEI(Θ)
dθi
=
D′i(E)p
′(E)
ΓI
< 0 . (A.8c)

Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Existence: By virtue of Assumptions 1 and 2, the maximization problem of country i’s
principal is strictly concave:
SOC
P |D
i ≡ B
′′
i (ωi)
(
dωi
dθi
)2
+B′i(ωi)
d2ωi
dθ2i
− θMi
[
D′′i (E)
(
dE
dθi
)2
+D′i(E)
d2E
dθ2i
]
=
(D′i(E))
2 SOCD−i(
ΓDi
)2
[
B′′i (ωi)SOC
D
−i − θiD
′′
i (E)B
′′
−i(ω−i)
]
< 0 .
(A.9)
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Thus, for each country i = 1, 2, the reaction function yields a unique best response for any
given choice θ−i of the other country. This guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Uniqueness: Solving (16) for the best response function, we derive
θDi (θ−i) ≡ θ
M
i
B′′−i(ω−i)
B′′−i(ω−i)− θ−iD
′′
−i(E)
. (A.10)
By virtue of Assumptions 1 and 2, B′′−i(ωi) and D
′′
−i(E) are (almost) constant. Then, the
reaction functions can be shown to intersect (at most) once in the feasible range Θ ∈
[0, θMi ] × [0, θ
M
−i] by inserting the reaction functions into each other and solving for the
equilibrium delegation choices. 
Proof of Corollary 3
The first property follows directly from equation (A.10) since B′′−i(ω−i) 6= 0. For deriving
the second property, solve equation (16) for the best response function as follows:
θDi (θ−i) = θ
M
i +
B′i(ωi)
D′i(E)
dωD−i/dθi
dED/dθi
. (A.11)
Therefore, θDi (θ−i) = θ
M
i if and only if dω
D
−i/dθi = 0, see equation (A.8a). 
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Existence: By virtue of Assumptions 1 and 2, the maximization problem of country i’s
principal is strictly concave:
SOC
P |I
i ≡
(
D′i(E)p
′(E)
ΓI
)2 [
p′(E)(3− e′−i(E))− θ−iD
′′
−i(E)− θ
M
i D
′′
i (E)
]
< 0 . (A.12)
Thus, for each country i = 1, 2, the reaction function yields a unique best response for any
given choice θ−i of the other country. This guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Multiplicity of equilibria: Solving equations (19) for the best response functions of each
principal, we can write (omitting the terms containing p′′(E) ≈ 0 and suppressing the
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arguments of the benefit functions):
θIi (θ−i) = θ
M
i +
p(E)
D′i(E)
θ−iD
′′
−i(E)− p
′(E)[1− e′−i(E)]
p′(E)
, (A.13a)
=
2 +
D′
−i
(E)
D′
i
(E) θ−i
[
θ−iD
′′
−i(E)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)B′′
−i
(.) −
B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
]
2−
[
θ−iD′′−i(E)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)B′′
−i
(.) −
B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
] , (A.13b)
θI−i(θi) =
2 +
D′
i
(E)
D′
−i
(E)θi
[
θiD
′′
i (E)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)B′′
−i
(.) −
B′′
i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
]
2−
[
θiD′′i (E)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)B′′
−i
(.) −
B′′
i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
] , (A.13c)
where we made use of equations (5), (7) and (13).
As all terms in (A.13b) and (A.13c) besides the delegation choice variables are – by virtue
of Assumptions 1 and 2 – almost constant, we define:
α ≡
D′−i(E)
D′i(E)
> 0 , β ≡
B′′−i(.)
B′′i (.) +B
′′
−i(.)
> 0 γi ≡ −
D′′i (E)
B′′i (.)
> 0 .
Applying these definitions to equations (A.13b) and (A.13c), we can express the reaction
functions as follows:
θIi (θ−i) =
2(1− β)− αθ−i [γ−iθ−i + β(1− β)]
2(1− β) + [γ−iθ−i + β(1− β)]
, (A.14a)
θI−i(θi) =
2αβ − θi [γiθi + β(1− β)]
α [2β + γiθi + β(1− β)]
. (A.14b)
Using these equations, it is straightforward to show:
dθIi (θ−i)
dθ−i
< 0 ,
dθI−i(θi)
dθi
< 0 , (A.15)
d2θIi (θ−i)
dθ2−i
R 0 ,
d2θI−i(θi)
dθ2i
R 0 . (A.16)
Both reaction functions are thus downward-sloping but either can be concave or convex
which implies that multiple equilibria may arise. Before characterizing the possible equilib-
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ria, we calculate:12
θi(0) =
2
2 + β
< 1 , θ0i =
1
2γi
[√
β2(1− β)2 + 8αβγi − β(1− β)
]
, (A.17)
θ−i(0) =
2
3− β
< 1 , θ0−i =
1
2αγ−i
[√
α2β2(1− β)2 + 8α(1− β)γ−i − αβ(1− β)
]
,
(A.18)
where θ−i(θ
0
i ) = 0 and θi(θ
0
−i) = 0. If both reaction functions are strictly concave, we can
have the following four cases, as illustrated by the four diagrams of Figure 3 (the same
reasoning applies to strictly convex functions or a combination of both):
i) Unique interior Nash equilibrium if and only if:
θi(0) < θ
0
i ∧ θ−i(0) < θ
0
−i . (A.19)
ii) Two corner Nash equilibria and at most two interior Nash equilibria (or a continuum
of Nash equilibria if the two reactions functions overlap) if and only if:
θi(0) ≥ θ
0
i ∧ θ−i(0) ≥ θ
0
−i . (A.20)
iii) One corner Nash equilibrium and at most two interior Nash equilibria if and only if:
θi(0) < θ
0
i ∧ θ−i(0) > θ
0
−i . (A.21)
iv) One corner Nash equilibrium and at most two interior Nash equilibria if and only if:
θi(0) > θ
0
i ∧ θ−i(0) < θ
0
−i . (A.22)
Equation (21) follows immediately from conditions (A.19).

12 For expositional convenience we drop the superscript I.
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Figure 3: Possible Nash equilibria of the delegation stage with concave
reaction functions.
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Proof of Corollary 4
The second term in equation (A.13a) is negative which is why we have θIi < 1, and it may
also be smaller than −1 in which case we get a corner solution.
To show statement (iii) we re-write the first-order conditions to yield:
θi = 1 +
[
1−
p′(E)[ωi − ei(E)]
D′i(E)
]
∂ω−i/∂θi
∂ωi/∂θi
. (A.23)
We further assume that country i is the seller of permits, i.e. ωi − ei(E) > 0. Define
∆ = −p′(E)[ωi − ei(E)] =
1
2
[
θ−iD
′
−i(E)− θiD
′
i(E)
]
> 0 . (A.24)
Thus, we have to show that
[
1 +
∆
D′i(E)
]
∂ω−i/∂θi
∂ωi/∂θi
<
[
1 +
∆
D′−i(E)
]
∂ωi/∂θ−i
∂ω−i/∂θ−i
. (A.25)
Inserting and re-arranging yields:
SOCIi SOC
I
−i
[
∆
D′i(E)
+
∆
D′−i(E)
]
− p′(E)
[
SOCIi
∆
D′i(E)
+ SOCI−i
∆
D′−i(E)
]
− p′(E)
[
SOCIi − SOC
I
−i
]
> 0 .
(A.26)
The first two terms are always positive and the third one is positive if SOCIi −SOC
I
−i > 0.
As
SOCIi − SOC
I
−i = 2
∆
E
− p′(E)[e′i(E)− e
′
−i(E)] , (A.27)
a sufficient condition for SOCIi − SOC
I
−i > 0 to hold is that e
′
i > e
′
−i, which, in turn, holds
if |B′′i (·)| < |B
′′
−i(·)|.

Proof of Proposition 5
We can re-write the reaction functions (A.10) and (A.13b) (again omitting the terms con-
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taining p′′(E) ≈ 0 and suppressing the arguments of the benefit functions) to yield:
θDi (θ−i) = θ
M
i +
D′′−i(E)θ−i
B′′−i(ω−i)−D
′′
−i(E)θ−i
, (A.28a)
θIi (θ−i) = θ
M
i +
[
1 +
D′
−i
(E)
D′
i
(E) θ−i
] [
θ−i
D′′
−i
(E)
B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.) −
B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
]
2− θ−i
D′′
−i
(E)
B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.) +
B′′
−i
(.)
B′′
i
(.)+B′′
−i
(.)
, (A.28b)
where we made use of equations (5), (7), (9) and (13).
Applying the definitions introduced in the proof of Proposition 4 to equations (A.13b) and
(A.28a), we obtain:
θDi (θ−i) = 1−
γ−iθ−i
1 + γ−iθ−i
, (A.29a)
θIi (θ−i) = 1−
(1 + αθ−i) [γ−iθ−i + β(1− β)]
2(1− β) + [γ−iθ−i + β(1− β)]
. (A.29b)
Then, delegation choices of country i under domestic permit markets are – for any given θ−i
of the other country – strictly higher than under an international permit market, θDi (θ−i) >
θIi (θ−i), if and only if the following condition holds:
LHS(θ−i) ≡(1 + αγ−i) [γ−iθ−i + β(1− β)]
> γ−iθ−i
[
(2− αβθ−i)(1− β)− αγ−iθ
2
−i
]
≡ RHS(θ−i) . (A.30)
It is straightforward to show that
dLHS(θ−i)
dθ−i
> 0 ,
dRHS(θ−i)
dθ−i
R 0 , (A.31)
d2LHS(θ−i)
dθ2−i
> 0 ,
d2RHS(θ−i)
dθ2−i
< 0 . (A.32)
LHS is a convex, RHS a concave function in θ−i. As LHS(0) = β(1−β) > 0 = RHS(0), LHS
and RHS will not intersect in the interval θ−i ∈ [0, 1] and thus θ
D
i (θ−i) > θ
I
i (θ−i) if:
dLHS(0)
dθ−i
>
dRHS(0)
dθ−i
− β(1− β) . (A.33)
Replacing the defined variables by the original terms yields equation (22). 
Details of the numerical illustrations
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For all numerical illustrations, we apply the following quadratic benefit and damage func-
tions:
Bi(ei) =
1
φi
ei
(
1−
1
2
ei
)
, B′i(ei) =
1− ei
φi
, B′′i (ei) = −
1
φi
, (A.34a)
Di(E) =
ǫi
2
E2 , D′i(E) = ǫiE , D
′′
i (E) = ǫi . (A.34b)
In Section 4 we employ the following exogenously given parameters:
φ1 = 1 , φ2 = 0.2 , ǫ1 = 1 , ǫ2 = 1 . (A.35)
This yields the following equilibrium delegation choices:
θD1 = 0.90 , θ
D
2 = 0.52 , θ
I
1 = 0.10 , θ
I
2 = 0.86 , (A.36)
as illustrated in Figure 1.
For the numerical exercise in Section 5 we parameterize functions (A.34) using relative
energy productivities from the OECD Green Growth Indicators database13 for the year
2011 and relative WTPs for abatement of carbon emissions from Carbone et al. (2009).
As there is no explicit data on energy productivities for the EU as a whole, we take the
productivity of all OECD countries together as a proxy. According to this database, China
exhibits approximately half the energy productivity of the OECD. Following Carbone et al.
(2009), Western Europe has a six times higher WTP to avoid climate damages than China.
As a consequence, we set the exogenous parameters to:
φ1 = 1 , φ2 = 0.5 , ǫ1 = 0.03 , ǫ2 = 0.2 . (A.37)
Sensitivity analyses: We first keep the WTPs constant but vary the energy productivities,
and then do the opposite. Consider an increase in the energy productivity in China such
that φ1 = 2/3. The results are depicted in Table 2. Again, China is the permit seller, and
an international permits market forms only in the case of self-representation. The corner
Nash equilibrium from before prevails, as can be seen in Figure 4.
Increasing China’s WTP from ǫ1 = 0.03 to ǫ1 = 0.15 yields a unique interior Nash equilib-
rium (see Figure 5). Again, a permit market forms under self-representation but is rejected
under strategic delegation, this time by both countries. The results are summarized in Table
3.
13 DOI:10.1787/9789264202030-en
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Without strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θ
R
2 ω
R
1 ω
R
2 e
R
1 e
R
2 E
R V R1 V
R
2
R = D 1 1 0.96 0.82 1.79 0.65 0.330
R = I 1 1 1.04 0.72 0.86 0.90 1.76 0.68 0.332
With strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θ
R
2 ω
R
1 ω
R
2 e
R
1 e
R
2 E
R V R1 V
R
2
R = D 0.91 0.98 0.97 0.82 1.79 0.65 0.33
R = I 0 0.82 1.08 0.75 0.90 0.92 1.82 0.67 0.30
Table 2: Overview of the outcomes in the subgame perfect Nash equilibria without and
with strategic delegation for φ1 = 2/3.
θ2
θ1
Figure 4: Reaction functions for the principals in country 1 (China, light) and country 2
(EU, dark) under the regimes R = D (red) and R = I (blue) on the delegation
stage (for φ1 = 2/3).
Effect of marginal change in environmental awareness
To analyze the effect of a marginal change in environmental awareness θMi of the principal,
we differentiate equation (23) for both countries with respect to θMi (suppressing some of
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Without strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θ
R
2 ω
R
1 ω
R
2 e
R
1 e
R
2 E
R V R1 V
R
2
R = D 1 1 0.80 0.84 1.64 0.16 0.436
R = I 1 1 0.84 0.77 0.74 0.87 1.61 0.18 0.438
With strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θ
R
2 ω
R
1 ω
R
2 e
R
1 e
R
2 E
R V R1 V
R
2
R = D 0.92 0.90 0.82 0.85 1.67 0.1499 0.42
R = I 0.26 0.82 1.00 0.75 0.83 0.92 1.75 0.1492 0.35
Table 3: Overview of the outcomes in the subgame perfect Nash equilibria without and
with strategic delegation for ǫ1 = 0.15.
θ2
θ1
Figure 5: Reaction functions for the principals in country 1 (China, light) and country 2
(EU, dark) under the regimes R = D (red) and R = I (blue) on the delegation
stage (for ǫ1 = 0.15).
the arguments):14
d∆Vi
dθMi
=
{
Di
(
ED(ΘD)
)
−Di
(
EI(ΘI)
)}
−
dθD−i
dθMi
[
B′i
(
ωDi (.)
)dωDi
dθD−i
−D′i
(
ED(.)
)dED
dθD−i
]
+
dθI−i
dθMi
[
p
(
EI(.)
) dωIi
dθI−i
+ p′
(
EI(.)
)[
ωIi (.)− e
I
i
(
EI(.)
)] dEI
dθI−i
−D′i
(
EI(.)
) dEI
dθI−i
]
,
(A.38)
14 In the strategic voting interpretation of our model, we would have to assume that the environmental
awareness of all agents changes alike as otherwise the identity of the median voter would change.
34
d∆V−i
dθMi
= −
dθDi
dθMi
[
B′−i
(
ωD−i(.)
)dωD−i
dθDi
−D′−i
(
ED(ΘD)
)dED
dθDi
]
+
dθIi
dθMi
[
p
(
EI(.)
)dωI−i
dθIi
+ p′
(
EI(.)
)[
ωI−i(.)− e
I
−i
(
EI(.)
)]dEI
dθIi
−D′−i
(
EI(.)
)dEI
dθIi
]
.
(A.39)
In country i, there is a direct effect on ∆Vi of a marginal increase in environmental aware-
ness (the term in curly brackets in (A.38)). This effect goes in the direction of the regime
with lower total emissions. However, there are also indirect effects through a change in the
equilibrium environmental awareness θ−i of the appointed agent in the other country in the
second stage which induces a change in the equilibrium permit choices of both countries
and thus aggregate emissions under both regimes in the third stage. Therefore, the payoffs
of country i’s principal change under both regimes. For the principal in country −i, there
are similar indirect changes in the payoffs under both regimes induced by a change in the
equilibrium environmental awareness θi of the selected agent in country i and the associated
changes in equilibrium permit choices in both countries.
To show that an increase (decrease) in environmental awareness may lead to a regime change
and thus bring about higher (lower) global emissions, we focus on the case of quadratic
benefit functions, as in (A.34), but linear environmental damages:
Di(E) = ǫiE , D
′
i(E) = ǫi , D
′′
i (E) = 0 . (A.40)
It can be easily shown that the signs of the terms in square brackets in equations (A.38)
and (A.39) are positive. Therefore, we need to evaluate the signs of dθRi /dθ
M
i and dθ
R
−i/dθ
M
i
for R ∈ {D, I}.
Using equations (A.28a) and (A.28b) for both countries, we find:
θDi = θ
M
i , θ
D
−i = θ
M
−i , (A.41)
θIi =
θMi
[
2(ǫi)
2(φi + φ−i) + ǫiǫ−iφ−i
]
− θM−i(ǫ−i)
2φi
2(ǫi)2(φi + φ−i) + ǫiǫ−iφ−i + (ǫi)2φi
< θMi , (A.42)
θI−i =
θM−i
[
2(ǫ−i)
2(φi + φ−i) + ǫ−iǫiφi
]
− θMi (ǫi)
2φ−i
2(ǫ−i)2(φi + φ−i) + ǫ−iǫiφi + (ǫ−i)2φi
< θM−i . (A.43)
Thus,
dθDi
dθMi
> 0 ,
dθD−i
dθMi
= 0 ,
dθIi
dθMi
> 0 ,
dθI−i
dθMi
< 0 , (A.44)
confirming our results that, for linear damages, delegation choices are dominant strategies
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in the domestic permit markets regime but strategic substitutes in the international permit
market regime.
Consider the situation of an established international permit market with EI < ED, i.e.,
∆Vi > 0 and ∆V−i > 0. Now assume, for example, that θ
M
i increases. Then, in equation
(A.38), the term in curly brackets is positive, the first term in square brackets drops out,
and the term in the second line is negative. There is thus a direct effect which goes in
the direction of the regime with lower emissions (the status quo regime) but an indirect
effect which goes in the opposite direction. If the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect,
the principal now favors the status quo regime less than before and may even change her
support from regime I to regime D. In this case, regime I breaks down and the new regime
exhibits higher global emissions. Moreover, in equation (A.39), the term in the first line is
negative and the term in the second line is positive. So even if the changes in payoffs for the
principal in country i do not suffice to induce a shift to the environmentally less friendly
regime, this may happen because the principal in the other country ceases her support for
regime I. The greening of preferences in one country may thus worsen the environmental
outcome.
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